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Firms must allocate some minimum amount of value to stakeholders in order to 
retain access to the resources they provide. Stakeholder theory suggests managers 
optimize firm-level performance by allocating more than this minimum amount. But how 
much is too much? This article addresses the misleading notion that more is always better 
when it comes to the treatment of stakeholders and, in doing so, provides a needed 
refinement of the boundary of stakeholder theory’s predictions.  The upside for managers 
is guidance in distinguishing between the types of value-allocating behaviors that will lead 
to greater value creation in their firms and actions that are likely to reduce value overall.  
 
 
Key Words: Stakeholder theory, organizational efficiency, managerial effectiveness, value, 
Malden Mills, Whole Foods
 3 
MANAGING FOR STAKEHOLDERS IS NOT FREE 
When Malden Mill’s Massachusetts factory burnt down, CEO Aaron Feuerstein not 
only decided to rebuild it in its comparatively expensive location, but he also continued 
paying his inactive workers’ salaries for three months. Malden’s focus on employees is 
reflected by Feuerstein’s own statement that the “company will be true to its mission of 
responsibility to the workers, as opposed to other interests (Moreno, 2003: 92).” His 
benevolence made him a corporate hero, and it was not unusual for his adoring employees 
to lavish him with praise, sometimes even kneeling and kissing his hand. Malden’s 
generosity also extended to the surrounding community through contributions to homeless 
shelters and neighborhood revitalization projects.  
As Malden Mills ran into financial difficulties stemming from the debts the company 
incurred after the fire, the Boston Globe called on the public to continue buying its 
signature product Polartec. Nevertheless, local public support was not enough the save the 
company from bankruptcy. Creditors removed Feurstein as CEO and worked out a plan 
with the courts to save the company. However, additional financial problems led to another 
bankruptcy and abandonment of the Malden Mills pension plan that covered over a 
thousand employees. Feuerstein, in spite of good intentions and a very popular product, 
had set the company up for failure. 
The Malden Mills case seems counter to the logic of stakeholder theory, which 
suggests that firms can achieve high levels of competitiveness and create more value if they 
treat their stakeholders generously, a management approach that might be called 
“managing for stakeholders” (Freeman, Harrison, & Wicks, 2007). In fact, a substantial 
amount of research supports this idea (see review in Freeman, et al., 2010). In one study, 
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researchers used an arduous process to select 30 firms exemplary of broad stakeholder-
based management (Sisodia, Wolfe, & Sheth, 2007). Examples of the firms on their list 
include Trader Joe’s, Honda, IKEA and Harley-Davidson. These companies outperformed 
the S&P 500 by significant margins over both short- and long-term time frames. Another 
research team examined the financial effect of a firm’s relations with its primary 
nonfinancial stakeholders, including customers, employees, communities, and the 
environment (Choi & Wang, 2009). Their study of 518 firms over a period of 11 years 
suggests not only that good stakeholder relations help firms sustain superior performance, 
but that they also help poorly performing firms recover more quickly from 
disadvantageous positions.  
How can we understand what happened at Malden Mills in the face of all the 
research that supports the efficacy of a stakeholder-based management approach? Clearly 
there are benefits to munificent treatment of stakeholders, but there are also substantial 
costs. Malden Mills enjoyed tremendous support and loyalty from employees and its 
community, but the costs associated with creating that support and loyalty were so high 
that they could not be offset by the associated benefits. The only way managing for 
stakeholders works, from an economic perspective, is if the benefits exceed the additional 
costs.  
Still, establishing boundaries with regard to how much value to allocate to 
stakeholders is an open question. While stakeholder theory promotes better treatment of a 
broad group of stakeholders, it does not set limits with regard to this behavior. One of the 
factors that can stand in the way of a successful stakeholder-based strategy is that firms 
allocate too much value to one or several stakeholders, which amounts to “giving away the 
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store.” Clearly, firms must allocate some minimum amount of value to stakeholders in 
order to retain access to the resources they provide. Managing for stakeholders involves 
allocating more than this minimum amount. But how much is too much?  
This article addresses the misleading notion that more is always better when it 
comes to the generous treatment of stakeholders and, therefore, will help to remedy a 
common criticism and misunderstanding of stakeholder theory. We begin this paper by 
reviewing the basic arguments associated with managing for stakeholders and how firms 
receive returns from being generous with the value they allocate to them. We then build on 
this foundation to provide guidelines for helping to determine when a firm may be 
allocating too much (or too little) value to stakeholders. We follow with a discussion of 
implications for managers and scholars. 
ALLOCATIONS OF VALUE AND STAKEHOLDER RESPONSES 
Managers have responsibility for both fostering the creation of and distributing 
value to stakeholders through the activities of the firm. Stakeholders that are most closely 
associated with the firm’s value creation activities include employees and managers, 
customers, suppliers (including suppliers of capital), communities and the firm’s 
owners/shareholders. We will call these primary stakeholders. Coff (1999) suggests that 
firms need to allocate at least enough value to their stakeholders so that they will continue 
to do business with them. But one of the core principles of stakeholder theory is that firms 
should go above this minimum value and furthermore, that doing so provides benefits, 
including economic benefits, that exceed the additional costs (Freeman, 1984; Freeman, 
Harrison, & Wicks, 2007). 
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Benefits to Firms from Allocating Additional Value to Stakeholders 
One of the most widely cited reasons for the success of firms that manage for 
stakeholders is that they efficiently attract and retain stakeholders (Barringer & Harrison, 
2000; Freeman, et al., 2007). Firms that manage for stakeholders treat their stakeholders 
well, are trustworthy, and tend to be more socially conscious (because it is important to 
some stakeholders). Because of these characteristics, resource-providing stakeholders such 
as customers, suppliers and financiers are drawn to them, thus providing a competitive 
advantage. For example, in the natural food retailing industry, Whole Foods enjoys a stellar 
reputation for treating its stakeholders well, and this reputation has attracted many 
suppliers, customers and other stakeholders to the company. 
Affiliation with certain organizations can also provide stakeholders with feelings of 
esteem, connectedness and empowerment (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Investing energy in or 
doing business with an organization that exhibits behaviors that are consistent with their 
own values helps stakeholders develop a sense that they own a portion of the company and 
its purposes (Vanderwalle, Van Dyne, & Kostova, 1995). These types of factors are non-
monetary, but also critical to understanding the way stakeholders behave. In the case of 
Whole Foods, employees, suppliers and customers feel good about their associations with 
the company. They feel as though they “own” a piece of what the company does. Programs 
such as their 5-Step Animal Welfare Rating System and buying from local suppliers 
reinforce those feelings. 
Reciprocity, the mutual reinforcement by two or more stakeholders of each other’s 
actions, provides an important link in the relationship between the value a firm distributes 
and the amount it creates (i.e., Becker, 1986; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). The link is 
 7 
established on the recognition that economic actors’ behaviors are triggered primarily by 
their perceptions of fairness (Blau, 1964). Game theory supports the notion of reciprocity. 
For example, in the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma game, researchers have documented 
that the best strategy is to cooperate during the first round of play and then imitate 
(reciprocate) the opponent’s move for every successive round (Axelrod, 1980). Game 
theory has also demonstrated that actors’ perceptions of fairness are influenced by the 
material outcomes they receive (Nelson, 2001; Rabin, 1993). 
People reciprocate to the way they are treated by returning similar treatment. 
Trustworthiness leads to more trustworthiness. Sharing of valuable information 
encourages sharing of valuable information. Generosity leads to a return of generosity. If a 
stakeholder believes that a firm is providing more value than it is obligated to provide then 
they will likely reciprocate. For employees this could mean working harder or sharing 
valuable information with the employer, for customers this breeds loyalty and increases 
demand, for suppliers (including suppliers of financial capital) it could mean better terms, 
or for communities it could mean greater support for expansion projects. 
Positive reciprocity occurs when a firm provides a stakeholder with greater total 
value than expected and the stakeholder responds by putting forth greater effort on behalf 
of the firm. All else equal, a firm that generates a cycle of positive reciprocity among its 
stakeholders should create more value and enjoy higher performance than a rival firm that 
does not (Bosse, Phillips, & Harrison, 2009). Such a firm is then in a stronger position to 
allocate more value back to the stakeholders that helped to create it. Whole Foods’ 
Stakeholder Philosophy reflects this perspective: “Our ‘bottom line’ ultimately depends on 
our ability to satisfy all of our stakeholders. Our goal is to balance the needs and desires of 
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our customers, Team Members, shareholders, suppliers, communities and the environment 
while creating value for all. By growing the collective pie, we create larger slices for all of 
our stakeholders (Whole Foods Market, 2011: 2).” 
The norm of reciprocity also works the other way, however (Larson, 1992). When 
stakeholders perceive they receive less value than they should they negatively reciprocate 
towards the firm. Negative reciprocity can destroy value as stakeholders put forth below-
normal effort, and they may also behave in ways that actually increase costs for the firm 
such as sabotage, deception, legal suits, or boycotts. 
The Costs of Stimulating Reciprocity Among Stakeholders 
 As mentioned previously, activities that are likely to foster positive reciprocity 
among a firm’s stakeholders are associated with additional costs. In essence, the firm must 
allocate more value to obtain more value. One way value is allocated is through the 
material or financial benefits stakeholders receive from the firm. For example, customers 
receive value from the firm in terms of the quality and functionality of the products and 
services of the firm, as well as the services they receive after the sale. Employees receive 
material compensation through wages and benefits, perquisites, bonuses, profit sharing 
and so forth. Suppliers receive material compensation and other benefits for what they 
provide to the firm. Research suggests that full cooperation of stakeholders is only possible 
when they perceive that what they receive from the firm is fair relative to what members of 
their referent group receive (i.e., Adams, 1965). We will explore this idea further in the next 
section. 
Firms also allocate value to stakeholders in other ways that are not as easily 
measured in dollars and cents, such as the fairness of a firm’s decision-making processes 
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(Phillips, 2003). Processes that are perceived as fair by stakeholders add costs due to the 
increased time and attention managers pay to stakeholders, increased communications and 
information processing costs, and the additional amount of time it takes the firm to make 
decisions when more stakeholder input is considered. In addition, a firm that is sensitive to 
stakeholder interests may expend resources to support activities that have high appeal to 
certain stakeholders but do not directly add to their economic welfare. For example, Whole 
Foods supports a micro-financing program that helps poor people start businesses in 
developing countries. This program appeals to many of the company’s stakeholders and 
provides non-monetary value in terms of esteem from affiliation and a feeling of 
ownership, but it also adds costs. 
Whole Foods’ successes stand in stark contrast to Malden Mills’ failures, yet the 
driving forces appear to be similar in both organizations and there is evidence of 
stakeholder reciprocity in both cases. The key difference is in the amount of value allocated 
to stakeholders. We observe what might be considered an irresponsible amount of value 
allocated to stakeholders in the case of Malden Mills (at least in hindsight), whereas Whole 
Foods seems to have a healthy balance of value received from stakeholders to value 
allocated to them. So how can a firm determine how much value is too much (or too little) 
to allocate to stakeholders?  
EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF VALUE TO STAKEHOLDERS 
Stakeholder theory has a strong moral foundation. That is, it advocates for virtuous 
treatment of stakeholders because it is the morally correct thing to do (Freeman, et al., 
2010). While we acknowledge this reasoning, our approach is much more practical. It is 
efficiency based in that we are examining the allocation of value to stakeholders on the 
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basis of what makes sense from an economic perspective. At the same time, the practical 
foundation upon which we are building assumes that organizations should respect all of 
their stakeholders through treating them with dignity, honesty, and courtesy (Cropanzano, 
Bowen, & Guilliland, 2007; Phillips, 2003). This sort of treatment is a prerequisite for trust, 
and trust enables reciprocity. A stakeholder is unlikely to expend additional effort on 
behalf of, feel strong affiliation with, or exhibit a high level of loyalty to an untrustworthy 
organization. Since treating stakeholders with dignity, honesty and courtesy is not 
particularly expensive, generous applications of this type of treatment are unlikely to upset 
the marginal cost/benefit balance in a negative fashion. 
Too Little Value Allocated to Stakeholders 
It is necessary to establish a concept of what the lower bound of value allocated to a 
stakeholder might be so that we can discuss what exceeds it. A practical base level of value 
is the stakeholder’s opportunity cost. As a simplified example, assume that an employee is 
receiving a particular level of value from working for a firm in the form of salary and 
benefits and a feeling that the employer is fair in its decisions and adequately considers the 
welfare of employees. For that employee to feel motivated to leave the employer, she or he 
would have to locate another employer (or form of employment) with expectations of 
receiving enough additional value to compensate for the value currently received (and the 
cost of the switch). Even if the employee stays with the employer, the opportunity cost is 
highly relevant. If the employee believes that she or he is receiving total value that is higher 
than her or his opportunity cost, then positive reciprocity can influence their behavior. In 
addition to feeling loyal, the employee is more likely to expend additional energy, share 
important information, and work to enhance the welfare of the employer. 
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This sort of analysis applies to all of the primary stakeholders that interact with the 
firm. The nature of their relationship with the firm and thus the behavior they exhibit is 
dependent on the extent to which the firm offers them an attractive value proposition 
relative to other opportunities that are available to them; the value proposition includes 
both tangible and intangible factors. For instance, two firms might offer customers 
essentially similar products so they choose the firm that treats them better or that exhibits 
socially responsive behavior in areas they consider important. When any stakeholder 
receives value that is above their opportunity cost they tend to reciprocate with behaviors 
that help the firm to create more value within its total system of value creation, and this 
additional value can then be dispersed among stakeholders, thus continuing a positive 
cycle. 
Too Much Value Allocated to Stakeholders  
 
At the opposite extreme is a philosophy of giving highest priority to stakeholders’ 
short-term welfare by allocating excessive value to them. This can generate extraordinarily 
high costs for the firm that can actually damage its longer-term competitiveness, as in the 
case of Malden Mills. Table 1 contains examples of three other firms that hurt their own 
competitiveness by allocating too much value to particular stakeholders, thus leaving 
insufficient value for other stakeholders and for investments in future value-creating 
activities such as research and development or purchases of new technology. 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
By virtue of its apparent failure to set limits on a firm’s favorable treatment of 
stakeholders, stakeholder theory seems to promote a position in which firms may “give 
away the store” in the sense of spending so many resources in satisfying the needs and 
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wants of particular stakeholders, such as employees, communities or society as a whole, 
that they sacrifice profitability. Shareholder advocates have taken advantage of this 
vulnerability in the theory and suggested that any allocations of value to stakeholders 
beyond what is necessary to retain their participation is wasteful and that managers who 
do so are acting irresponsibly with regard to protecting shareholder interests (i.e., Jensen, 
2002). 
A firm allocates too much material value to a stakeholder when the marginal unit of 
value received by the stakeholder results in less than a unit of new value created through 
reciprocity on the part of stakeholders. This is difficult to determine precisely on a 
stakeholder-by-stakeholder basis, but there are broader signals that too much value has 
been distributed. One signal is when there is not enough material value for other 
stakeholders to maintain their willful participation in the firm. For example, this may 
happen when a firm gives high priority to shareholder allocations such as dividends or 
share buyback programs at a time when employees are receiving compensation below 
what is found in other firms in their markets and industries. In this example the firm is 
allocating too much value to one stakeholder group at the expense of another stakeholder 
group; the expected result is ultimately value destruction as a result of negative reciprocity 
from the employees (Akerlof, 1982). Another signal is when the firm’s resources are being 
depleted at a level at which it is difficult to sustain a healthy production cycle in the firm, 
which includes pre-production activities such as research and development, core 
production activities and post-production activities such as marketing, distribution and 
service. 
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In terms of a firm’s decision-making processes, too much stakeholder involvement 
occurs when the decision process becomes too complex to manage effectively – process 
inefficiency threatens productivity. When a firm is providing too much voice, participation 
and influence to stakeholders, decision quality is not marginally improved by each 
successive bit of stakeholder influence or information. Perhaps this is due to a particular 
stakeholder being given too much input to the decision or it could be that the firm is going 
too far in terms of giving voice to every conceivable stakeholder or in trying to consider too 
many stakeholder needs or perspectives in its decision-making processes. Inefficiency may 
also occur because collecting information from a broad group of stakeholders can uncover 
previously undiscovered conflicts of interest that then have to be resolved. Table 2 contains 
a description of the lower and upper boundaries of value allocations to stakeholders, as 
well as the optimal position from an efficiency perspective. 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
Value Creating Allocations of Value to Stakeholders 
Managers face a difficult challenge trying to stimulate positive reciprocity towards 
the firm without diluting the value created by the firm. The concept of a ‘just noticeable 
difference’ can help a firm determine how to allocate material value back to stakeholders. 
This concept was developed in the organizational psychology literature and has been 
applied to a variety of human resource issues (Zedeck & Smith, 1968). A simple explanation 
is that for an improvement in an employee’s situation (i.e., a raise) to make a positive 
difference in the way they respond to the organization it must be enough of an 
improvement for the employee to notice. Otherwise the effort is wasted. The just noticeable 
difference has also been applied to marketing, where the question is how much a product 
 14 
must be improved before customers will select it over a competing product (Britt & Nelson, 
1976). We are applying the term here a little differently than it has been used previously. A 
just noticeable difference means that the value a firm offers to a stakeholder is noticeably 
recognized and appreciated by the stakeholder as being better than value propositions 
offered by firms that compete for what they offer to the firm. 
Each stakeholder is a part of a factor or product market. Customers provide 
financial and other resources to the firm. Each non-customer stakeholder supplies an 
important factor of production to the firm in exchange for a combination of tangible and 
intangible goods. For instance, an employee offers her skills, knowledge and labor in 
exchange for a mix of financial (i.e., salary, benefits) and non-financial (i.e., affiliation-based 
esteem, influence in decision making) goods. The same sort of logic applies to other 
stakeholders as well.  
A firm that provides a package that stakeholders perceive is better than what they 
could get from a different firm is in a strong position to unlock positive reciprocity and the 
other benefits discussed previously, including obtaining strategic intelligence, new 
opportunities, loyalty, efficient transactions, and others. Google seems to have mastered 
the ability to attract many of the most highly skilled and talented employees in an industry 
in which there is fierce competition for human capital. They offer all the normal benefits 
one would expect from a big company, such as health insurance, life insurance and 
retirement benefits. However, Google considers these benefits only the beginning (Google, 
2012). The company has established a goal to make employees’ lives better and easier, with 
on-site physicians and nurses, emergency travel assistance, special benefits for parents, 
reimbursement for education, and free legal advice. It is easy to see that many of these 
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benefits, in addition to making the firm more attractive to potential employees, also help 
make employees more productive. 
To enjoy an efficient ratio of value created to value allocated to stakeholders, the 
firm need only exceed the package a stakeholder could get elsewhere in its factor or 
product market. In the case of Google, it takes a lot to surpass what direct competitors 
offer, but in many other situations this is not the case. Also, while industry norms provide a 
useful benchmark in determining what is a noticeable difference, managers more typically 
determine this through discourse with their stakeholders, because many stakeholders are 
able to jump from one industry to another. A salesperson can get firsthand information on 
what appeals to customers and the value propositions offered to them by competing firms. 
Similarly, buyers can gain this sort of information from interactions with suppliers. 
In terms of decision-making processes, a firm cannot logically afford to open every 
decision to every stakeholder’s input. Instead, managers must practically distinguish which 
stakeholders are most salient to include and for which decisions. Stakeholders should be 
given voice in the decisions and processes that most directly affect them or if, in other 
ways, they are powerful with respect to the firm (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). 
Stakeholder power is one of two very important dimensions that can help managers 
determine whether their firms are in danger of under- or over-allocating value to their 
stakeholders. 
Determining the Potential for Under- or Over-Allocations of Value 
Two well-documented forces are at work in terms of how much value is allocated to 
particular stakeholders: power and strategic importance. Stakeholders that are part of the 
firm’s value creation processes have economic power, which is the ability to influence the 
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financial success of the firm. Some of the other factors that might give stakeholders power 
include possessing valuable resources the firm needs (resource dependence), the ability to 
influence the political process in its favor or against the firm (political power), strong ties 
to other stakeholders that are important to the firm (network centrality), or the ability to 
sway public opinion for or against the firm (opinion leadership) (Porter, 1980; Rowley, 
1997). Powerful stakeholders have the capacity to reduce the ability of the firm to achieve 
its value-creating objectives through withdrawing their resources or support. For the 
purpose of assessing the potential for under- or over-allocating value to a given 
stakeholder, we focus on their ability and propensity to hurt the firm resulting from the 
power they possess.  
The other force, strategic importance, pertains to the ability of a stakeholder to 
contribute to making the firm more competitive. For instance, strong suppliers make auto 
manufacturers like Toyota and Honda more competitive.  
The principle of reciprocity suggests that firms should be especially careful to 
allocate an attractive amount of value to strategically important stakeholders because 
doing so is likely to provide a high return. However, reality suggests that powerful 
stakeholders may be able to extract more than their fair share of value, as in the case of the 
unions in the U.S. auto industry. Combining these two dimensions can help managers 
identify which stakeholders might be under- or over-rewarded for what they provide to the 
firm, from an efficiency perspective (see Figure 1). 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
The highest priority stakeholders with regard to allocations of value (material and 
decision processes) are high in both power and strategic importance. However, because 
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they are powerful they are likely to be getting attractive value packages from the firm 
already. Their power could actually be resulting in over-allocations of value; however, 
because they are strategically important these over-allocations may not hurt efficiency too 
much. At the other end of the spectrum, low priority stakeholders, because they lack power 
and strategic importance, are not likely to have too much or too little value allocated to 
them. Their lack of power means that they cannot extract much additional value from the 
firm and their lack of strategic importance means that additional allocations of value are 
less likely to lead to the positive reciprocity that increases value created by the firm.  
This situation is in contrast to stakeholders who are powerful but are not 
strategically important. For these stakeholders a careful balancing act is required. The firm 
will not get as much in return for additional value allocated to these stakeholders because 
they are not important to competitiveness, but their ability to hurt the firm means that they 
should not be neglected. Special interest groups with a lot of political clout, such as the 
Sierra Club and the National Rifle Association, frequently fall into this category. So also do 
suppliers of scarce materials that are essential to a firm but do not help the firm 
differentiate its products. For example, very little high quality sand is available for use by 
the cement industry in many locations of the world. Although high quality sand is 
necessary to produce cement, all cement producers use it, so it cannot serve to differentiate 
the product. However, if a sand supplier feels under-rewarded and stops supplying a 
particular cement manufacturer with what they need, it could lead to serious problems for 
the manufacturer.  
Stakeholders with low power and high strategic importance are the most likely to 
have value under-allocated to them because their lack of power means that they are not as 
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salient to managers. Essentially, they are not as “loud” in the planning process. Vendors in 
competitive markets are likely to fall into this category. Although they may not have a lot of 
market power or political clout, they can be central to achieving strategies that include 
differentiating products and services or targeting particular markets. Both vendors and 
buyers in competitive markets likely possess valuable intelligence that is useful for 
directing the strategies and activities of the firms with which they do business. It is these 
types of stakeholders that managers might want to pay special attention to in their 
planning processes because of the potential to unlock the forces from reciprocity if they are 
not already receiving a package of value that is perceived as better than what they might 
receive through transactions with other firms. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND BUSINESS SCHOLARS 
This article has implications for both the practice of management and for 
management scholars. For managers, we have addressed the issue of how to align the 
interests of stakeholders such that they will contribute more to value creating processes 
while not jeopardizing the productive efficiency of the enterprise. Specifically, we have 
provided guidance that may be useful in determining which stakeholders are most likely to 
receive under- or over-allocations of value relative to their importance to the firm and the 
value they help to create.  
As stakeholders perceive that they are getting a better value proposition from the 
firm than they would get elsewhere, reciprocity can result in the creation of additional 
value. These stakeholders are more likely to share important information with the firm. 
The ability of the firm to attract stakeholders means that new opportunities are presented 
and sales may increase. Other results may include more efficient transactions, loyalty, and 
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fewer negative stakeholder actions such as legal suits or boycotts. However, some 
stakeholders are more important than others. Specifically, powerful stakeholders have a 
greater ability to extract additional value from the firm, and strategically important 
stakeholders hold the greatest potential for gains through reciprocity. Combining these two 
dimensions results in suggestions with regard to determining which stakeholders are more 
or less likely to receive over- or under-allocations of value from the firm, in terms of 
efficiency. 
 For scholars, the contribution this paper makes is to clarify a practical boundary of 
stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory is not about “giving away the store”… it is about 
optimizing the performance of a group, where performance can be defined in terms of total 
value created. This paper provides a needed refinement of the boundary of stakeholder 
theory’s predictions. It is not strictly true that firms that provide more value to 
stakeholders outperform other firms. A firm can provide too much value to one or more of 
its stakeholders, as demonstrated in the cases of Malden Mills, Fannie Mae, General Motors 
and Total SA. Also, the concept of a just noticeable difference provides an interesting 
empirical question for researchers. In particular, are firms that treat each of their 
stakeholders just a little better than they are treated by other firms in an optimal position 
to create value, or should firms focus on one or two stakeholder groups? 
 To some extent, our paper is oversimplified in that there are ongoing assumptions 
that stakeholders can be managed and that they do not have hostile ulterior motives. 
Future research might address what happens to the value allocated to stakeholders that are 
hard to manage or are hostile and expect an unfair allocation of value from the firm. 
Another potentially profitable research area that is linked to the ideas contained in this 
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article is performance measurement. Value can be created across an entire resource 
coordination system. Consequently, existing measures of firm performance, which are 
largely financial, are not adequate to capture the total value created in such a system. 
Future research could include case studies as well as survey and archival studies. 
Case studies could include companies that are managing for stakeholders while not giving 
away the store, companies that seem to be allocating too much value to particular 
stakeholders, and firms that are not allocating enough value, in its multiple forms, to 
stakeholders. The theory presented herein also lends itself to a large-sample test to 
determine if firms that fall into these categories have differential financial performance. 
Research of this type offers the potential to advance stakeholder theory and better explain 
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TABLE 1 
Possible Examples of Over-allocating Value to Stakeholders 
 
Company Too much value distributed to: Diminished value available to: Performance problems 
General 
Motors 
Employees—due to a very strong 
union the company had wages 
and benefits packages that made 
its automobiles a poor value 
proposition (price relative to 
quality) in comparison with rivals, 
and most notably foreign rivals 
such as Toyota and Honda.  
Customers and Financial Capital 
Providers—both were big losers, as 
demand dropped off and the 
company was no longer able to 
provide a fair return to its 
shareholders and eventually was 
unable to cover its financial 
obligations to creditors. 
Financial performance was poor for 
so long that eventually the U.S. 




Shareholders and Mortgage 
Companies—the company 
continuously lowered its 
underwriting standards for 
mortgages in an effort to keep its 
mortgage pipeline growing to 
please private shareholders.  
Mortgage Holders—many home 
buyers, especially those with 
adjustable rate mortgages, ended up 
buying homes they could not afford, 
ending in a record number of 
foreclosures. Foreclosures were both 
caused by and an indirect cause of 
the weakening economy. 
Concern that the company would 
become insolvent led the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to 
place the company into 
conservatorship. The CEO and board 
of directors were dismissed, and 
dividends on outstanding stock were 
suspended. 
Total SA Local Communities – the company 
has shown a pattern of bending to 
controversial local community 
practices to both secure and sell 
oil such as bribery in Iraq and 
Italy and defying economic 
sanctions in transactions with 
Iran and Myanmar.  
Employees and Suppliers—
stakeholders at home in France and 
in 130 other countries who feel 
misled by the company’s promise to 
“forge fair, sustainable, trust-based 
relationships with [stakeholders].” 
The company incurs greater costs 
due to extra scrutiny by legal 
authorities in France and the EU. It 
also incurs the marginal costs of 
attracting new stakeholders who 
have alternative opportunities with 





Boundaries on Value Allocations to Stakeholders 
 
 Material or Financial Value Decision-Making Processes 
Description Stakeholders perceive that their distribution of 
material or pecuniary compensation is fair 
relative to other stakeholders 
Fairness of firm’s decision making processes; 
transparency, solicitation of ideas, excellent 
communications, and use of input to decisions, 
flexibility 
Lower Bound Material value stakeholders would receive in their 
next best alternative relationship with a firm 
(opportunity cost) 
Level of input and consideration that would be 
received by the stakeholder in similar situations with 
other firms (opportunity cost) 
Upper Bound Not enough material value to adequately 
compensate other stakeholders or insufficient 
resources to sustain healthy operations over the 
long term; marginal unit of value given to 
stakeholder is less than the unit of value 
reciprocated back to firm over several cycles 
Decision process too complex to manage; inefficiency 
threatens productivity; possibly too many 
stakeholders involved in processes 
Optimal Level A just noticeable difference; stakeholders perceive 
that the value they receive is better than what 
they would receive elsewhere by just enough to 
make a difference to them  
Constructive input to processes and decisions 
solicited from primary stakeholders without giving 
too much priority to any particular stakeholders; 
stakeholders consider process fair 
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